Pay Unto Caesar: Breaches of Justice in the Monetary Sanctions Regime by Pattillo, Mary & Kirk, Gabriela
UCLA
UCLA Criminal Justice Law Review
Title










eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
49
© 2020 Mary Pattillo and Gabriela Kirk.  All rights reserved.
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Breaches of Justice in the Monetary 
Sanctions Regime
Mary Pattillo and Gabriela Kirk
Abstract
Monetary sanctions include fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, in-
terest, and other costs imposed on people who are convicted of crimes 
ranging from traffic violations to violent felonies.  We analyze how people 
in the court system theorize about monetary sanctions with regards to 
four kinds of justice: constitutional, retributive, procedural, and distrib-
utive justice.  Drawing on qualitative interviews with sixty-eight people 
sentenced to pay monetary sanctions in Illinois, we identify five themes 
that illuminate how respondents think about these forms of justice: mon-
etary sanctions are: (1) justifiable punishment, (2) impossible to pay due 
to poverty, (3) double punishment, (4) extortion, and (5) collected by 
an opaque and greedy state.  We find that for defendants in the criminal 
justice system, monetary sanctions serve some retributive aims, but do 
not align with the other three domains of justice.  We discuss the policy 
implications of these findings.
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Introduction
In his concurring opinion in the 2019 Timbs v. Indiana decision, 
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas quoted a 1680 English House 
of Commons finding.1  “[T]he Court of King’s Bench, in the Imposition 
of Fines on Offenders of late Years, hath acted arbitrarily, illegally, and 
partially; favouring Papists and Persons popishly affected; and excessive-
ly oppressing his Majesty’s Protestant Subjects.”2  In other words, since 
the days of monarchy, courts administered by those in power have used 
monetary sanctions as an oppressive governing tool.  Yet it required the 
Timbs ruling in 2019, to recognize that the prohibition against levying 
excessive fines expressed in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
also applied to the states.
That state authorities have been acting like kings of old would come 
as no surprise to a sixty-two-year-old man we interviewed in Illinois in 
2017.  “Give Caesar what’s due,” he told us, referring to the over $5000 
in court costs, fines, and fees that he estimated he had been sentenced to 
pay for various felonies and misdemeanors, all drug and traffic related. 
He continued, only somewhat sarcastically, “Why should we pay Caesar? 
Whose face is on the money?  Caesar!  Then you pay Caesar what’s due.” 
He was homeless and reported a total monthly income of $192 in food 
stamps.  Are his fines excessive?  Is that justice?
The Timbs ruling was the first time in over twenty years that the 
Supreme Court took up the excessive fines clause within the Eighth 
Amendment, which reads in full: “Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflict-
ed.”3  Yet Timbs had a very narrow purview, only addressing the question 
1. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
2. Id. at 694.
3. U.S. Const. amend VIII.
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of whether states are “incorporated” to the Eighth Amendment.4  The 
justices unanimously decided that they are.  Given the single question, 
the opinions are relatively short, leaving many crucial details about what 
constitutes excessive fines yet to be clarified.  We focus on the questions 
of proportionality and ability to pay as components of excessiveness.5 
We also go beyond the constitutional justice that the Supreme Court 
metes out to explore retributive, procedural, and distributive justice, 
concepts that are of broad interest to social scientists, criminologists, and 
legal scholars, and that together offer a comprehensive appraisal of the 
justness of monetary sanctions from the perspective of those ordered to 
pay them.  Such (il)legitimacy may affect the state’s ability to collect on 
these debts.6
Ideas of justice pervaded our qualitative interviews with sixty-eight 
people sentenced to pay court fines and fees in Illinois.  We identified five 
primary themes in the data and discuss how each theme provides both ev-
idence and theory regarding important domains of justice.  Respondents 
expressed that monetary sanctions are: (1) justifiable punishment, (2) im-
possible to pay due to poverty, (3) double punishment, (4) extortion, (5) 
and collected by an opaque and greedy state.  On the Eighth Amendment 
issues of proportionality and ability to pay (i.e., constitutional justice), we 
show how the seemingly small amounts of these monetary sanctions be-
came disproportionate to the crimes committed because of the substantial 
financial burden they represented.  Respondents saw greater alignment 
with retributive justice, although the addition of monetary sanctions to 
other punishments went too far.  Monetary sanctions breached respon-
dents’ sense of procedural and distributive justice without qualification. 
In this Article, we first define the four types of justice and discuss the 
literature on monetary sanctions.  We then describe our data and method 
and present our findings.  We conclude by arguing that the purpose of 
monetary sanctions is the social control of disfavored groups, and we call 
for the elimination of monetary sanctions as a sentencing practice for 
poor and near poor defendants.
I. Types of Justice
Constitutional justice “addresses only a subset of justice” dealing 
with “urgent and nonnegotiable requirements that are fundamentally of 
a piece with the articulate principles of the adjudicated Constitution.”7 
4. One of the authors participated in an Amicus Curiae brief in the Timbs case.  See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
5. Also to be decided is if statutory fines, costs, fees, etc. qualify as fines under the 
Eighth Amendment.  See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challeng-
ing the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 2 (2018).
6. R. Barry Ruback et. al., Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Sur-
vey of Offenders, 70 Fed. Prob. 26 (2006).
7. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Consti-
tutional Practice 129, 142–4 (2004).
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Tyson Timbs, the name plaintiff in Timbs v. Indiana, experienced the 
forfeiture of his $42,000 Land Rover as a “prominent failure”8 of fair 
treatment, and he turned to constitutional protections for redress.  His 
SUV was confiscated when he was arrested for selling drugs to an under-
cover cop as part of a sting.  The maximum fine for the offense, his first, 
was $10,000.  While the local court thwarted the prosecution’s attempt to 
use civil forfeiture laws to take the SUV, and the Appeals Court agreed, 
the Indiana Supreme Court reversed those decisions and ordered the 
taking, ruling that the state was not bound by the Eighth Amendment’s 
“excessive fines” clause.9  In Timbs v. Indiana, however, the Supreme 
Court unanimously ruled that states are so bound, upholding the state’s 
lower courts’ decisions that the forfeiture violated constitutional justice.
Yet, many questions remain.  As Timbs’ lawyers argued after 
the ruling:
The Timbs decision has gone some distance to restoring [the Eighth 
Amendment’s] prominence, but the Court still needs to address a 
wide variety of critical issues.  What exactly counts as a “fine”?  How 
should courts determine when a fine becomes “excessive”?  Should 
courts consider people’s inability to pay fines or their effect on 
livelihoods?10
There is a growing body of legal theory and argumentation that 
addresses the issues of proportionality and ability to pay.11  This Article 
offers the perspectives of people paying court costs, fines, and fees on 
these pending questions of constitutional justice.  Can even small fines 
and fees be excessive given the nature of the crime and/or the defen-
dant’s inability to pay?
Beyond the constitution, our inductive analysis pointed to retrib-
utive, procedural, and distributive justice as additional domains that 
captured the sentiments of the people we interviewed, even if they did 
not use that language.  Retributive justice is the idea that punishment 
is the just response to an offense.12  Proportionality—or calibrating the 
intensity of the punishment to the seriousness of the crime—is a key 
8. Sager, supra note 7, at 139.
9. See Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An interdisciplinary 
examination of involuntary property loss, 12 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 171 (2016).
10. Scott Bullock & Nick Sibilla, The Supreme Court Resuscitates the Eighth 
Amendment, Atlantic (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ 
archive/2019/03/unanimous-supreme-court-decision-policing-profit/584506 
[https://perma.cc/7RWC-2QK9].
11. Kevin Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21 
(2016); Colgan, supra note 5; Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, 
and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings Const. L. 
Q. 833 (2013); Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 
85 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1869 (2018).
12. Dena. M. Gromet & John. M Darley, Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice 
Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals. 43 L. & Soc’y Rev. 1 (2009); Michael 
S. Moore,  Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (1997).
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consideration in retributive justice.13  Do defendants in Illinois acknowl-
edge the punitive aims of monetary sanctions?  And, in their opinion, 
does the punishment fit the crime?
While retributive justice is about an outcome—namely punish-
ment—procedural justice focuses on the process.  Are the rules of the 
game fair and followed?  Were all parties heard and treated with respect? 
Did authorities act ethically and honestly?  Do legal actors have legiti-
macy?14  A considerable body of research on procedural justice asks if 
a fair process leads to greater compliance with the law.15  For example, 
Gladfelter, Lantz and Ruback16 find that perceptions of more fair treat-
ment by probation officers lead probationers to pay more towards their 
court-ordered restitution.  Yet while procedural justice is often framed in 
instrumental terms, it is also an end in itself, “a collective, cultural relation-
ship with the law.”17  How do Illinois residents with monetary sanctions 
evaluate their days in court?  Were they listened to?  Did judges, lawyers, 
and probation officers follow the rules?
Finally, distributive justice is about the fairness of the distribu-
tion of “valued resources” and the allocation of “rights, responsibilities, 
costs, and burdens.”18  Distributive justice helps to explain attitudes to-
wards economic systems,19 evaluations of pay equity,20 appraisals of 
material wellbeing,21 and even Tea Party membership.22  In criminology, 
ideas of distributive justice affect the allocation of police services23 and 
13. Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Pun-
ishment, 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57 (2008).
14. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & Soc’y Rev. 103 (1988).  For the limitations 
of the procedural justice framework, see Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Lau-
ra Beth Nielsen Situated justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequali-
ty in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 L. & Soc’y Rev. 1 (2012).
15. For a review of the literature on procedural justice, see Daniel S. Nagin & Cody 
W. Telep, Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance, 13 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 5 
(2017).
16. Andrew S. Gladfelter, Brendan Lantz & R. Barry Ruback, Beyond Ability to 
Pay: Procedural Justice and Offender Compliance with Restitution Orders, 62 
Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 4314 (2018).
17. Monica Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
Yale L.J. 2054 n.134 (2017).
18. Karen S. Cook & Karen A. Hegtvedt, Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality, 9 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 217, 218 (1983). See also Serena Olsaretti, The Oxford Hand-
book of Distributive Justice (2018).
19. Jennifer Hochschild, What’s Fair?: American Beliefs about Distributive 
Justice (1981).
20. C. Wesley Younts & Charles W. Mueller, Justice Processes: Specifying the Medi-
ating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 125 (2001).
21. Duane F. Alwin, Distributive Justice and Satisfaction with Material Well-Being, 52 
Am. Soc. Rev. 83 (1987).
22. Rory McVeigh, Kraig Beyerlein, Burrel Vann & Priyamvada Trivedi, Education-
al Segregation, Tea Party Organizations, and Battles over Distributive Justice, 79 
Am. Soc. Rev. 630 (2014).
23. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy 
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correctional officers’ treatment of inmates.24  We explore how interview-
ees talk about the literal costs that are imposed on (distributed to) them 
within the overall distribution of burdens and benefits in society, and 
their attitudes towards where their dollars go.
Our main concern in this Article is how respondents opine on these 
matters of justice.  Their positions do not constitute a definitive reading 
of the justice of monetary sanctions.  Instead, their legal conscious-
ness—as disproportionately working-class, low-income, and non-white 
subjects in the criminal courts—represents their “participation in the 
process of constructing legality.”25  Moreover, we build on the proposi-
tion that “having criminal law rules reflect community shared judgments 
of justice . . . produces the best practical approximation of true justice.”26 
Hence, understanding the perspectives of defendants is necessary to 
achieving the system’s legitimacy and fairness.
II. Research on Monetary Sanctions
Monetary sanctions include fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, in-
terest, assessments, and other court costs imposed on people who are 
convicted of crimes ranging from traffic violations
to violent felonies.27  State and federal statutes authorize these 
sanctions and define the amounts and ranges to be charged, as well as the 
accounts into which revenues should be deposited.  Fines and fees are 
both punitive and generate revenue for states, either to compensate the 
state for its labor and services or to fund special interests that have little 
to do with criminal justice functions.28  Interest and penalties are levied 
against those who do not pay their fines or fees on time.  Restitution com-
pensates victims for their loss.  The nomenclature of monetary sanctions 
varies from state to state, and may also include words like “assessments,” 
“costs,” or “surcharges.”29
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & Soc’y Rev. 513 (2003); David 
Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. of Quantitative Criminol-
ogy 275 (2011).
24. Benjamin Steiner & John Wooldredge, Examining the Sources of Correctional 
Officer Legitimacy, 105 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology. 679 (2015).
25. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from 
Every day Life, 45 (1998) .
26. Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Chal-
lenge of Social Change, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1565, 1580 (2016).
27. See generally Claire Greenberg, Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Grow-
ing and Broad Nature of Legal Financial Obligations: Evidence from Court Re-
cords in Alabama, 48 Conn. L. Rev. 1079 (2016) (discussing monetary sanctions 
imposed prior to conviction); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary 
Criminal Justice, 4 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 1175 (2014).
28. Brittany Friedman & Mary Pattillo, Statutory Inequality: The Logics of Monetary 
Sanctions in State Law, 5 The Russell Sage Found. J. of the Soc. Sciences 173 
(2019).
29. Alexes Harris, Beth Huebner, Karin Martin, Mary Pattillo, Becky Pettit, Sarah 
Shannon, Bryan Sykes, Chris Uggen & April Fernandes, Monetary Sanctions in 
the Criminal Justice System, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (Apr. 2017), 
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The policy, legal, and social science literature on monetary sanc-
tions has grown tremendously in the last decade.30  This body of work 
has documented a number of important features of monetary sanctions.31 
First, the use of monetary sanctions by the federal government, states and 
municipalities has grown in the past three decades, as have the amounts 
that people are sentenced to pay.32  Second, people struggle to pay their 
court debt, which makes it even more difficult to pay for other essential 
expenses such as food, housing, health care, medicine,
transportation, and raising children.33  This burden is not borne sole-
ly by those convicted of crimes, but also by their family members.34  Third, 
because people are not released from criminal justice supervision until 
their accounts are fully paid, monetary sanctions prolong supervision, 
increasing the likelihood of probation violation infractions, worsening 
punishment for any new criminal conduct, and leading to incarceration 
for nonpayment.35  Finally, there is a racially disparate impact of monetary 
http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ Monetary-
Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf.
30. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 
(Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
31. Karin Martin, Bryan Sykes, Sarah Shannon, Frank Edwards & Alexes Harris, 
Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obligations in US Systems of Justice, 1 Ann. 
Rev. of Criminology 471 (2018) (reviewing research on monetary sanctions).
32. Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A 
Barrier to Re-entry, Brennan Center for Justice (2010); Devin Fergus, Land 
of the Fee: Hidden Costs and the Decline of the American Middle Class 
(2018); Greenberg et al., supra note 27; Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Kath-
erine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in 
the Contemporary United States, 115 Am. J. of Soc. 1753 (2010); Alexes Harris, 
A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for the Poor (2016); 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees against Commu-
nities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications (Sept. 2017), 
www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf.
33. Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, The Cost of Justice: The Impact of Crim-
inal Justice Financial Obligations on Individuals and Families, (Aug. 
2018), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/publications/the-cost-of-justice-the-impact-
of- criminal-justice-financial-obligations-on-individuals-and-families [https:// 
perma.cc/XE87-9LLE]; Harris et al., supra note 32; Alexes Harris, Beth Hueb-
ner, Karin Martin, Mary Pattillo, Becky Pettit, Sarah Shannon, Bryan Sykes & 
Chris Uggen, United States Systems of Justice, Poverty and the Consequences of 
Non‐Payment of Monetary Sanctions: Interviews from California, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, New York, and Washington, Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation (Nov. 2018).
34. Saneta deVuono-Powell, Chris Schweidler, Alicia Walters & Azadeh Zohrabi 
Who Pays?  The True Cost of Incarceration on Families, Ella Baker Center, 
Forward Together, Research Action Design (Sept. 2015); Mary Fainsod Kat-
zenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the Poor: Incarceration, Poverty Gover-
nance, and the Seizure of Family Resources, 13 Persp. on Pol. 638 (2015); Josh-
ua Page, Victoria Piehowski &  Joe Soss, A Debt of Care: Commercial Bail and 
the Gendered Logic of Criminal Justice Predation, 5(1) RSF: The Russell Sage 
Found. J. of the Soc. Sci. 150–172 (2019).
35. American Civil Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New 
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sanctions due to the aggressive policing of Black and Latinx neighbor-
hoods and because those groups are less able to immediately pay.36, 37
Following Ewick and Silbey’s38 use of interviews and narratives to 
understand legal consciousness, we add to the research on monetary sanc-
tions by listening to how people talk about their court debt to develop 
themes about justice.  There are very few studies that use empirical data to 
explore how respondents theorize about the justness of their court debt. 
Allen and Treger found that a majority of over 80 federal probationers 
they surveyed saw their fines and restitution as punishment, but they 
struggled to pay and felt threatened by criminal justice officials if they did 
not pay.39  The authors did not use a justice frame, but the findings suggest 
that defendants acknowledged retributive justice but experienced a lack 
of procedural justice.  Gladfelter et al. found that offenders in Pennsylva-
nia had strong intentions to pay ordered restitution because they saw it 
as a legitimate form of retributive justice (again, not the authors’ frame), 
and were more likely to pay when their probation officers treated them 
fairly (procedural justice).40  Another survey in Pennsylvania found that 
offenders did not rate highly any of the possible justice goals of economic 
Debtors’ Prisons (Oct. 2010); Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal 
Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prison, 51 Harv. 
Civ. Rights-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 189 (2016); U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 30.
36. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Courtesy Stigma and Mon-
etary Sanctions: Toward a Socio-cultural Theory of Punishment, 76 Am. Soc. Rev. 
234 (2011); Christian Henrichson, Stephen Roberts, Chris Mai, Ayesha Dela-
ny-Brumsey, Mathilde Laisne, Chelsea Davis & Rose Wilson, Past Due: Ex-
amining the Costs and Consequences of Bail, Fines and Fees in New Orleans, 
Vera Inst. of Just. (Jan. 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/ 
downloads/Publications/past-due-costs-consequences-charging-for-justice-new-
orleans/legacy_downloads/past-due-costs-consequences-charging-for- justice-
new-orleans.pdf [https://perma.cc/S887-LNLM]; Kasey Henricks & Daina 
Cheyenne Harvey, Not One But Many: Monetary Punishment and the Fergusons 
of America, 32 SS1 Soc. F. 930 (2017); Alex R. Piquero & Wesley G. Jennings, Jus-
tice System-Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in 
a Sample of Adolescent Offenders, 15 Youth Violence & Juv. Just. 325 (2017); 
Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government?  Descriptive 
Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 The J. of Pol. 1090–1094 
(2017).
37. See also Amaia Iratzoqui & Christi Metcalfe, Set Up For Failure?  Examining 
the Influence of Monetary Sanctions on Probation Success, 28 Crim. Just. Pol. 
Rev. 370 (2017); Douglas C. MacDonald, Judith Greene & Charles Worzella, 
Day Fines in American Courts: The Staten Island and Milwaukee Experiments, 
U.S. Dep’t of Just. (1992); Piquero et al., supra note 36; R. Barry Ruback, Lau-
ren K. Knoth, Andrew S. Gladfelter & Brendan Lantz, Restitution Payment and 
Recidivism: An Experimental Analysis, 17 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 789 (2018).
38. Ewick, supra note 25.
39. G. Frederick Allen & Harvey Treger, Fines and Restitution Orders Probationers’ 
Perceptions, 58 Fed. Prob. 34–40 (1994).
40. Andrew S. Gladfelter, Brendan Lantz & R. Barry Ruback, Beyond Ability to 
Pay: Procedural Justice and Offender Compliance with Restitution Orders, 62 
Int’l J. of Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 4314 (2018).
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sanctions (e.g. retribution, rehabilitation, restoration of the victim).41 
Harris interviewed people with monetary sanctions in Washington State. 
Many respondents in her study raised issues of distributive justice—for 
example, one stated “it seems to me like the way our criminal justice 
system works, you know, there’s too many people making money out of 
corrections.”42  Bögelein interviewed forty-four people sentenced to pay 
day fines in Germany and explicitly engages ideas of retributive and pro-
cedural justice.43  Her respondents saw monetary sanctions as justified for 
retributive ends, but did not understand how they were determined and 
felt their money was going towards a greedy state.44  We build on these 
studies and put constitutional, retributive, procedural, and distributive 
justice at the forefront of our analysis.
III. Setting, Data, and Methods
In 2017, we conducted sixty-eight in-depth interviews with residents 
of Illinois who had been sentenced to pay court costs, fines, fees, and 
restitution.45  We recruited this convenience sample through a range of 
methods, including Craigslist ads; approaching people after court hear-
ings; and hanging flyers in courthouses, private defense attorneys’ offices, 
public libraries, community centers, nonprofit organizations serving for-
merly incarcerated persons, and university legal clinics.  We also gained 
permission to sit in the lobbies of several probation offices across the state 
in order to recruit participants.  We did interviews in eight counties, cap-
turing the city of Chicago and its close and far suburbs, as well as urban 
and rural areas in mid- and downstate Illinois.  We offered respondents 
$15 in appreciation for their time.  We do not name the places outside of 
Cook County and Chicago where we did interviews since many had small 
populations and doing so could compromise respondents’ anonymity and 
confidentiality.
Illinois is neither unique nor an outlier in its practices regarding 
monetary sanctions.46  The extreme localism of monetary sanctions at 
the state and municipal levels makes national comparisons difficult,47 but 
various state comparisons strongly suggest that there is no such thing as 
41. R. Barry Ruback, Stacy N. Hoskins, Alison C. Cares & Ben Feldmeyer, Percep-
tion and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Survey of Offenders, 70 Fed. Prob. 
26 (2006).
42. Harris, supra note 32, at 59.
43. Nicole Bögelein, ‘Money Rules’: Exploring Offenders’ Perceptions of the Fine as 
Punishment, 58 The Brit. J. of Criminology  805 (2017).
44. See also Ruback, supra note 41.
45. The coauthors conducted twenty-nine of the sixty-eight interviews.  The remain-
der were conducted by Brandon Alston, Erica Banks, Niamba Baskerville, Brit-
tany Friedman, and Austin Jenkins.
46. Martin et al., supra note 31; Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are 
Paying the Price, Nat’l Pub. Radio (May 1, 2014), [https://perma.cc/C3P7-Z657].
47. Karin D. Martin, Bryan L. Sykes, Sarah Shannon, Frank Edwards & Alexes Har-
ris, Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obligations in. U.S. Systems of Justice, 1 
Ann. Rev. of Criminology 471 (2018).
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a representative state or jurisdiction in the case of monetary sanctions.48 
Like many states, Illinois’ constitution contains language about propor-
tionality, stating that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according 
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the 
offender to useful citizenship.”49  It also states that “[n]o person shall be 
imprisoned for failure to pay a fine in a criminal case unless he has been 
afforded adequate time to make payment, in installments if necessary, 
and has willfully failed to make payment.”50
Many states are reviewing their systems and laws regarding mone-
tary sanctions, making it a critical moment to offer evidence on the topic.51 
In Illinois, the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act was signed into law in 
2018.52  It took effect in July of 2019, with an automatic repeal provision 
at the end of 2020, if key state agencies determine that it has been detri-
mental to their finances.  The new law introduces sliding scale fee waivers 
for people earning up to 400 percent of the poverty level.  Because the 
law is not retroactive, it offers no relief to the people we interviewed.  We 
discuss future implications of the new law throughout the Article.
The descriptive characteristics of our interview sample are includ-
ed in Table 1.  Our sample was 57 percent men and 43 percent women. 
African American respondents made up half of the interviewees, White 
respondents were 32 percent, and Latinx respondents were 12 percent. 
Most of our interviewees were poor or near poor; the majority (59 
percent) had incomes (including government assistance and/or social 
security) of under $1500/month.  A small minority (10 percent) had in-
comes over $3000/month.  Just over half were unemployed and just over 
half had experienced homelessness at some point in their lives.  Nearly 
half (46 percent) had both felony and misdemeanor convictions, and a 
minority of convictions (26 percent) were for violent offenses.
48. Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, The Brennan Cent. for 
Justice, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Re-Entry (2010), https:// perma.
cc/ARN5-5W6E; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees 
Against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications 
(2017).
49. Ill. Const. art 1, § 11, [https://perma.cc/W6MS-5NWD].  See Collaboration for 
Justice, Statement on Excessive Court Fines, Fees, and Costs (2016), [https://
perma.cc/WRN8-AN83].
50. Ill. Const. art. 1 § 14.
51. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 48, at 51–68, 196–218; The Clear-
inghouse, Fines & Fees Justice Center, (last visited Jan. 25, 2020), https:// 
finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/clearinghouse/?sortByDate=true.
52. Ill. Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act, 705 ILCS § 135, (2018).
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Sample N = 68
Gender
       Men 57%
       Women 43%
Mean Age 41
Race
       Black 50%
       White 32%
       Latinx 12%
       Biracial/Other 6%
Income
       Below $1,500/mo 59%
       $1,500–$3,000/mo 31%
       Above $3,000/mo 10%
       Percent unemployed 50%
       Percent ever homeless 51%
Criminal Case
       Felony only 31%
       Misdemeanor only 24%
       Both felony and misdemeanor 46%
       Violent felony or misdemeanor 26%
       Percent served jail/prison time 84%
We cannot accurately determine the representativeness of the 
sample because there is no state-level data on people with financial sen-
tences.  However, our numbers on race and poverty align pretty closely 
with those in the court system.  In 2017, 62 percent, 29 percent, and 9 
percent of misdemeanants in Illinois were White, Black, and Other, re-
spectively.53  The racial makeup of Illinois’ imprisoned population—most 
of whom have felony convictions—is 56 percent Black, 31 percent White, 
and 13 percent Latinx.54  Our sample overrepresents women (43 percent), 
given that they are 29 percent of those convicted of misdemeanors, and 
6 percent of the imprisoned population.55  There is little information on 
the socioeconomic status of justice-involved Illinois residents.  In Cook 
County, 89 percent of defendants qualify for a public defender, which 
suggests that the financial precarity of our respondents is not unusual.56
53. Ill. Sentencing Pol’y Advisory Council, Misdemeanor Sentencing: Trends 
and Analysis (2018).
54. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report 79 (2017), https://
perma.cc/EFW7-TGV2.
55. Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, supra note 53; Ill. Dept. of 
Corrections, supra note 54.
56. Kim Bellware, Chicago Judge Orders Access to Free Lawyers at Police Stations, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/D7QM-7K7A]; Illinois 
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Interviews lasted forty-two minutes on average.  They took place 
in coffee shops, restaurants, probation offices, and, less frequently, in a 
respondent’s home.  We used a uniform interview guide, which included 
a close-ended survey for demographic characteristics, details about mon-
etary sanctions, and general wellbeing questions (e.g. “Have you ever had 
any periods of homelessness?”), and open-ended interview questions 
about respondents’ experiences at sentencing and how monetary sanc-
tions affected their lives—employment, housing, finances, health, family, 
and overall.  The transcribed interviews were analyzed using NVIVO 
qualitative data analysis software.  Because this study is part of a larger 
five-year, eight-state study of monetary sanctions, the coding strategy was 
particularly comprehensive.  We coded for sixty-two topics across eleven 
domains, ranging from respondents’ mention of “stress or strain” in pay-
ing monetary sanctions to their “public assistance” use (or nonuse) to the 
possible impact on attaining “professional licensing.”  For this Article, we 
draw especially from the code for respondents’ evaluation of the “fair-
ness” of their monetary sanctions, as well as the codes “consequences for 
non-payment,” and “assessing ability to pay.”
We also interviewed court personnel—judges, lawyers, probation 
officers, and clerks—and conducted 241 hours of courtroom observations 
across the state.  While we use these data sparingly in this Article, they 
constitute an important empirical check on the narratives that we pres-
ent.  We do not take the interviewees’ reports at face value, but rather 
present them within the corroboration of our larger study.57  We are con-
fident of the five themes that we highlight because we also saw evidence 
of them in our courtroom observations.  In the following Subparts, we lay 
out the sequence of argumentation yielded by our analysis of the inter-
views and how each point speaks to a particular type of justice.  Table 2 
maps the five themes and their relationships to justice.
Table 2: Empirical Themes and Types of Justice
Theme Type of Justice
Justifiable punishment Satisfies retributive justice
Too poor to pay Violates retributive and constitutional justice
Double punishment Violates retributive and constitutional justice
Extortion Violates procedural and constitutional justice
Collected by an opaque and greedy state Violates procedural and distributive justice
Criminal Justice Information Authority, Examining Illinois Probationer 
Characteristics and Outcomes (2011), https://perma.cc/F8CP-6AHL (discuss-
ing the socioeconomic status of those on probation).
57. See Colin Jerolmack & Shamus Khan, Talk is Cheap: Ethnography and the Atti-
tudinal Fallacy, 43 Soc. Methods & Res. 178 (2014) (discussing best practices for 
the use of interviews and qualitative data); Steven Lubet, Interrogating Eth-
nography: Why Evidence Matters (2018).
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IV. Findings
A. Justifiable Punishment
The people we interviewed in Illinois believed in retributive jus-
tice.  They recognized that there are consequences to law breaking and 
accepted the authority of the judicial system to impose penalties.  Their 
statements of recognition were robust and included elements of contri-
tion and support for deterrence and rehabilitation.  A forty-eight-year-old 
Black woman from downstate Illinois said the following:
You know, it’s fair, because you make it on yourself.  If you put your-
self in the situation where you have to come into the court system, 
in the system, you have to just pay for your consequences, you know.  
I mean, it’s fair.  I mean, sometimes  I think they can be a little bit 
harsh on some people, because it’s hard when, like I say, you don’t 
have a job and you know, you have to look around where you live 
at.  Things are not easy access for some people.  But like I say, you 
choose what you want to do.  When you wake up, if you choose to do 
something wrong, hey, you put yourself there and you have to take 
your own responsibilities.  That’s part of life.
The interviewer probed a bit and asked, “I noticed you said you 
feel like you should pay for your consequences.  How do you think you 
should pay?”  The woman repeated:
Like I know this don’t belong to me, so if I walk out of this door 
with this, I’m stealing.  So, you know, if the court, if they catch you, 
you going to have to pay something.  You know, they going to offer 
you some prob[ation].  I mean, it’s just how it is, it’s the rules of life.  
We got rules.
In this exchange, the interviewer offered the respondent an opportunity 
to perhaps backtrack, to blame someone else, to minimize the roughly 
twenty misdemeanor convictions on her record, most for theft.  Instead, 
she repeated herself, and ended with the clear affirmation that there are 
rules that must be followed in society.  The cost for breaking the rules 
might justly include monetary sanctions as a form of punishment.
Others accepted their sentence with similar matter-of-factness.  A 
middle-aged biracial woman also from downstate said, “It was my wrong 
doing.”  A young Asian man from the suburbs of Chicago said, “I’m not 
gonna lie.  It is fair.  Coming from me, I sound crazy, but it does sound 
fair.”  And a twenty-eight-year-old Black man, also living in Chicago’s 
suburbs, said, “At the end of the day you can’t really blame nobody but 
yourself for the fees you have to pay, because you’re the one that got in 
trouble.”  When the system is working, retributive justice is well-calibrat-
ed to the crime.  Sometimes it even leads to deterrence or rehabilitation. 
A thirty-six-year-old Black man from downstate Illinois with over twenty 
property felonies confessed:
I ain’t going to lie to you, man.  It made me realize, it ain’t them.  It’s 
me.  You know what I’m saying?  These fines made me realize it’s 
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me.  I’m the problem.  I’m the cause of it . . . I used to play the blame 
game.  When that judge say, “You don’t want to listen?  Don’t want to 
obey?”  You know what I’m saying?  “See if this $400 fine help wake 
you up.”  Yeah.  Made me realize I’m the problem . . . .  Basically, I 
done gave you permission to set me straight, [to] fine me.  I done 
gave you permission to take out my pocket.  But yeah, these fines, 
boy, they’ll wake you up though.
Yet while many people saw monetary sanctions as in line with 
retributive justice, unqualified statements of this position were rare. 
More common was a sense that some monetary punishment was just, 
but the degree of punishment given their financial means (i.e., “you don’t 
have a job and, you know, you have to look around where you live at”) 
was out of balance.
B. Too Poor to Pay
In theory, the graduated waivers for people earning up to 400 per-
cent of the federal poverty line approved in the 2018 Illinois Criminal 
and Traffic Assessment Act mean that if someone is too poor to pay, they 
will not be required to do so.  While a momentous step forward, the re-
form has considerable limitations.  The waivers are only applicable to 
fees and costs, not to fines or restitution.  The mandatory fine that cannot 
be waived for a first-time DUI offense, for example, is $1,000.58  Nei-
ther does the new law give waivers for probation fees or court-mandated 
classes or treatment.  Also, defendants must apply for the waiver within 
thirty days of conviction, so successful implementation relies heavily on 
public awareness, compliance, and proactive counsel.  The new law is not 
retroactive, offering no relief for people like our interviewees already 
sentenced to pay monetary sanctions.  Finally, the consequences for non-
payment that we discuss later remain in effect.  The waivers represent 
progress, but poor defendants may still be disproportionately burdened.
It is important to calibrate how the dollar amounts of court costs, 
fines, and fees sound to the people upon whom they are imposed.  Forty 
of the sixty-eight people (59 percent) we interviewed had incomes below 
$1500 per month.  Many people were facing monetary sanctions that 
equaled a whole month’s earnings, if not more.  Hence, relatively small 
payments could be daunting.  “It’s $50 a month.  That’s expensive,” said a 
twenty-eight-year-old White man who lived in one of Chicago’s outlying 
suburbs.  “No one has that kind of money when you just come out of jail.” 
He had spent five months in jail for a felony sex crime.  When he first 
came out, he was jobless and owed $2500 in court costs, fines, and fees. 
When we interviewed him, he reported his earnings as between $1500 
and $2000/month, so he was more advantaged than most.  The judge had 
imposed a $50 minimum monthly payment or he risked violating pro-
bation.  As with many respondents, it was the amount of the sanction 
given his financial situation that he protested, not the idea of punishment. 
58. Ill. Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5 § 11-501(c)(3) (2019).
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“Well, maybe you shouldn’t have done something stupid?” he concluded 
about himself.  “I know I regret what I did, I will tell you that wholeheart-
edly.  You reap what you sow.”  Nonetheless, he was stressed about how 
he would pay his debt.
Two women in downstate Illinois, both with misdemeanors and 
both reporting less than $500/month in income, mentioned how paying 
their monetary sanctions competed with their responsibilities as moth-
ers.  “It’s a strain on me,” said one.  “I can’t get things I need for my kids 
because I’m thinking, ‘Oh, shoot, wait, I gotta go pay this fine.’  It’s like 
they taking all my money, you know what I mean?”  Her friend offered 
more detail:
Now it’s affected me really bad .  .  .  .   School’s about to start back.  
[My son] does a lot of sports and stuff.  Who’s going to do all of that?  
I can’t afford that.  I’m just like, “Oh, please let this judge have mercy 
on me on the fifteenth when I go.”  I’m not no troublemaker.  You 
know I’m not no troublemaker, so just give me a $25 a month fine.  
I’ll pay that.
Several respondents similarly detailed their monthly accounting 
and expenses for us.  A fifty-year-old transgender Latina woman in Chi-
cago who had fines and fees of over $1000 told us, “I live out of $720 a 
month.  With that I manage to pay rent, pay phone, pay light . . . .  I do get 
Link [Illinois’ food stamps card], but you cannot buy what you need with 
the Link.  Sometimes you’re in need of deodorant or whatever.”  These 
reports of juggling competing necessities are supported by the findings 
of a convenience survey of 269 people with court debt in three cities in 
Illinois.  The authors found that 72 percent, 62 percent, and 62 percent 
reported forgoing groceries, utilities, and rent, respectively, to pay mone-
tary sanctions.59
Not surprisingly, some respondents were involved in the criminal 
justice system because of crimes of poverty.  A woman in downstate Il-
linois shared what landed her in jail on a misdemeanor theft conviction:
You go in the store, hey, I need something to eat for my kids or some-
thing, and you take it.  I mean, I know you could get help, but like I 
say [it’s] a small town here, it’s not a lot of places to help you.  You 
go and take some food out the store and you get caught . . . and then 
you have to go to court and all that.  And you tell the judge well, hey, 
the reason why I done this is my kids was hungry and there was just 
no other option.
She had $500 in court costs, fines, and fees and reported an income of 
between $500 and $750 per month.  Not only is she lacking the money to 
pay her monetary sanctions, she continues to bear the poverty that com-
pelled her to offend in the first place, and there are few social services 
available in her small town to help.
59. Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, supra note 33.  For similar 
findings, see Harris, supra note 32; Harris et al., supra note 32.
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If there is some retributive justice functions of the system of mon-
etary sanctions, which many respondents recognized, it is undermined by 
the fact that many people cannot afford to pay what they are assessed.  A 
forty-two-year-old Black woman in a Chicago suburb said, “Clearly we’re 
low-income.  I know that it’s a form of punishment, however it doesn’t 
make a means to the end  .  .  .  .    It’s just, none of it makes any sense.” 
Retributive justice is overwhelmed by the impossibility of complying 
with this form of punishment, which is more burdensome for those who 
cannot pay.  Proportionality, then, must be examined relatively.  Retribu-
tive justice is breached because complying with the punishment is nearly 
impossible for some defendants, which also makes such punishment in-
terminable,60 often for minor infractions.  Constitutional justice is also 
imperiled when punishment is disproportionate, as proportionality is 
a component of excessiveness.  The other component of excessiveness 
is ability pay.  McLean traces the historical precedents of the Eighth 
Amendment and argues that it assumes an “economic survival norm” 
such “that a defendant not be fined an amount that exceeded his ability 
to pay.”61  The people we interviewed were routinely sentenced to pay 
more than they could manage without seriously affecting their general 
wellbeing.  For them, their poverty called into question the constitutional 
and retributive justice of monetary sanctions.  Moreover, monetary sanc-
tions were only one component of their punishment.
C. Double Punishment
Uggen and Stewart describe “piling on” as the multiple layers 
of criminal justice sanctioning, each of which has its own collateral 
consequences, and the sum of which often undermines any efforts at re-
habilitation or desistance.62  In our sample, 84 percent of respondents had 
served either jail or prison time for their offense.  Nearly all had been 
on probation.  Their criminal records partially explained why they were 
too poor to pay monetary sanctions.  A thirty-one-year-old White woman 
from the middle of the state stated it plainly:
Most people are like “Felony?  Nope.  We don’t want you,” which is 
even harder because then you can’t earn the money to pay the fines, 
you know what I’m saying?  It’s like a neverending circle.  Like, if you 
get a felony, nobody wants to hire you.  Nobody wants to hire you, 
you can’t pay what you’re supposed to pay.
She had two felonies and two misdemeanors for property and drug 
crimes.  The penalties were piling on:  “I mean, if I’m going to be on six 
years [of] probation, do I really need to pay $6,000 in fines?  You guys 
already have me.”
60. Harris, supra note 32.
61. McLean, supra note 11, at 835–37.  See Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic 
Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 53 (2017).
62. Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and 
Community Supervision, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1871 (2014).  See Eisha Jain, Capital-
izing on Criminal Justice, 67 Duke L.J. 1381 (2017).
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Many respondents felt that having done jail time was an appropri-
ate punishment for their crime, but that adding monetary sanctions that 
they could not pay was disproportionate, thus violating retributive justice 
and a component of constitutional justice.  “I’m the one gotta do the jail 
time and why should I have to pay?” asked a thirty-one-year-old Black 
woman in Chicago’s suburbs who spent twenty-six days in jail for a felo-
ny drug conviction.  A fifty-one-year-old Black man, also from Chicago’s 
suburbs, thought it was profoundly unfair that his fines and fees grew 
to $9000 as he did eighteen months in prison for a drug felony.  “If I’m 
already found guilty, got to take me away from my family for the next, 
however so long, that’s that.  That’s what I thought.”  Of course he was 
wrong; he owed the monetary sanctions on top of his prison sentence. 
And the fifty-year-old Latina woman living off of $720/month had done 
jail time and community service.  She complained: “I have a problem with 
the court fees because I think, man, I did five months, I did community 
service . . . .  I did my time for it, why should I have to pay again for it? 
That’s double punishment for me.”  Far from shirking responsibility or 
expressing disdain for retributive justice, these respondents instead saw 
jail as a considerable penalty, one that they had paid.  Anything above 
that exacted a cost far greater than the gravity of the crime.
Even when they had not done jail time, many thought that proba-
tion alone obviated the rationale for additional sanctions.  The reality 
was quite the opposite.  Probationers in Illinois are charged up to $50 per 
month to be on probation.  This was anathema to the people we spoke 
with.  “You shouldn’t have to pay for the privilege of being on proba-
tion,” said a forty-two-year-old Black man in Chicago.  Probation also 
comes with several other conditions that have additional costs.  These are 
the “invisible punishments” of intermediate sentencing,63 but they are far 
from invisible to those facing them.  A fifty-one-year-old Black man in 
Chicago who spent four days in jail and two years on probation for a DUI 
detailed some of those additional costs:
Look, especially in Cook County, anytime you become a part of 
the county probationary system, if they send you to a lab for a drug 
screen, you’re getting the bill for that.  The courts aren’t paying for 
that.  They’ll order you to go do something, but you have to pay for 
it.  If you have to go to a drug and alcohol class, you have to pay for 
that.  If they recommend you to go to a treatment program, you’re 
paying the bill for that.  Getting in trouble is very easy, getting out of 
trouble is very difficult.
Over many years he completed all of these facets of his sentence and 
paid off the roughly $4000 in court fines and fees on reported income of 
between $2500 and $3000/month.
63. Uggen et al., supra note 62.  See Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: 
How to Add Transparency, Legitimacy, and Purpose to Collateral Punishment 
Policy, 10 Harv. L. and Pol. Rev. 123 (2016).
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The piling on of fees clearly breached respondents’ sense of retrib-
utive justice.  The multiple layers of punishment were in excess of their 
crime.  A thirty-year-old Black man in one of Chicago’s outlying counties 
asked, “How many times do you reprimand a person for a mistake in 
their life?”  He went on to answer his question from firsthand experience:
You’re telling me that I get reprimanded three or four times for this 
offense and if something happens again, I get reprimanded three or 
four times for that offense plus I get more time for the old offense I 
did that I’ve already been done and over with?  It’s not fair.
This young man was no angel.  He had two felony convictions for drugs 
and armed robbery.  He spent four months in jail and was sentenced to 
roughly $2000 in monetary sanctions.  His monthly income was $600 
from work secured though a temporary staffing company.  He recognized 
the “mistake in his life,” but the consequences of his actions seemed to 
have no end.
If television courtroom dramas have made the prohibition against 
“double jeopardy” a commonly known fact, the possibility of double (or 
more) punishment is something more narrowly experienced by people 
within the real criminal justice system.  Jain64 shows how this piling on 
creates financial gain for a wide range of actors who literally capitalize 
off of punishment.  While some part of the suite of punishment serves 
retributive goals, the additional penalties “come at the expense of other 
important interests, such as proportionality.”65  This disproportionality vi-
olates retributive justice.  It is also a novel perspective for thinking about 
the excessiveness of fines, and thus constitutional justice.  Given that 
monetary sanctions are imposed on top of jail, prison, probation, com-
munity service, and other court-mandated programs, the data we present 
raise the possibility that most monetary sanctions violate constitutional 
justice because they are excessive in low-level criminal cases where the 
retributive function is already served by other forms of punishment.
D. Extortion
Unlike for unpaid credit card bills, student loans, mortgages, or 
payday loans, the criminal justice system wields a big stick in compel-
ling people to pay their court debt: incarceration.66  Both the Illinois 
64. Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 Duke L.J. 1381 (2017).
65. Jain, supra note 64.
66. See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-9-3 (2013) “(a) An offender who defaults in the pay-
ment of a fine or any installment of that fine may be held in contempt and im-
prisoned for nonpayment.  The court may issue a summons for his appearance or 
a warrant of arrest. (b) Unless the offender shows that his default was not due to 
his intentional refusal to pay, or not due to a failure on his part to make a good 
faith effort to pay, the court may order the offender imprisoned for a term not to 
exceed 6 months if the fine was for a felony, or 30 days if the fine was for a mis-
demeanor, a petty offense or a business offense.”  See Brittany Friedman & Mary 
Pattillo, Statutory Inequality: The Logics of Monetary Sanctions in State Law, 5 
Russell Sage Found. J. of Soc. Sci. 173 (2019).
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Constitution67 and the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Bearden v. Georgia68 
prohibit imprisonment for nonpayment of court fines without first hold-
ing a hearing to determine if a person was willful in not paying.  These 
laws do not, however, stop states attorneys, judges, and probation officers 
from both scaring defendants into paying, and (unconstitutionally) im-
prisoning them without holding such a hearing.  According to a survey 
conducted by the Chicago Collaboration for Justice, 26 percent of re-
spondents reported “receiving additional jail time” for not paying their 
court costs, fines, and fees.69  Several studies document the same practice 
in other states.70
The threat of incarceration and other punishments—such as ex-
tending probation time, sending bills to credit reporting agencies, and 
terminating probation unsuccessfully—constituted strong breaches of 
procedural justice for the people we interviewed.  They reported that 
their inability to pay was never considered by court personnel, neither 
during sentencing nor in any subsequent hearings.  Instead, they were 
threatened outright or intimidated by what they observed happening to 
other people.  Obtaining something through threat of force is extortion.
The extension or revocation of supervision or probation for non-
payment of monetary sanctions was a common occurrence.  Many people 
reported it in interviews, and we observed it regularly in our courtroom 
observations.  This negative consequence was purely because people 
could not pay.  “Yeah.  They have me on unsupervised probation,” re-
ported a twenty-nine-year-old Black woman from downstate Illinois 
who had a misdemeanor conviction for fighting, which she claimed was 
in self-defense.  “Then they put me back on unsupervised probation be-
cause my fine wasn’t paid off.  What do they expect?  I’m moving out of 
[public] housing, no income, with three kids, and I’m pregnant now.”  The 
breach of procedural justice is evident in her rhetorical question: “What 
do they expect?”  The public housing authority in the area was condemn-
ing her housing and she was unsure of where she would move.  She was 
unemployed.  She reported income of less than $500 per month.  Her 
probation officer knew her circumstances.  The assumption on the part of 
the court that she would pay, that she could pay, seemed ridiculous to her, 
and the consequence for not paying was a process failure due to having 
67. Ill. Const., art. 1 § 14.
68. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
69. Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, supra note 33.
70. American Civil Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New 
Debtors’ Prisons (2010), [https://perma.cc/CH9Q-29KP]; Torie Atkinson, A 
Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of 
the New Debtors’ Prison, 51 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 189 (2016); 
Sarah Dolisca Bellacicco, Safe Haven No Longer: The Role of Georgia Courts 
and Private Probation Companies in Sustaining a De Facto Debtors’ Prison Sys-
tem, 48 Geor. L. Rev. 227 (2014), [https://perma.cc/TM8W-768Q]; Christopher 
D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 Am. J. of Crim. L. 1 (2016), 
[https://perma.cc/GG7T-Z3EL].
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expectations that were clearly unachievable.  When the extension of pro-
bation didn’t yield payment in her case, the stakes got higher:
They told me when I went to court that if I didn’t have $607 that 
he was going to try to send me to jail.  I was like, “Can we work out 
a payment plan?” [He responded,] “Oh no.  It’s been a year.  You 
should be done paying it.”  That’s what the judge told me . . . .  He 
told me I had to pay something.
With that threat, the woman came up with $100.  “But he knows you 
don’t have a source of income?” the interviewer asked about how the 
judge could be so firm without taking into account her inability to pay. 
“He don’t care,” was her initial response.  Later, she got more verbose, 
imagining what she might say at her next court date:
Well, I have to be honest and tell him just how I feel, just like 
he’s going to tell me how he feel.  He don’t give a damn about my 
fine . . . .  Y’all are desperate for some money for a self-defense.  Well, 
just do that, because my kids come first.  Sorry.  If I don’t have that 
$25 a month, I’m going to tell you.  I will call and let y’all know, “Hey, 
I need to get something for the kids.  It’s school about to start back.  
You want to see my receipt?”
Procedural justice in her mind would first include care, some human 
acknowledgement of her financial struggles.  Next, it would include her 
having a voice.71  As she imagined telling this to the judge—speaking 
boldly “against the law”—she also heard her mother admonishing her 
for doing so.72  “My mom’s like, ‘You can’t talk to him like that!’”  She had 
not talked to the judge like that when he threatened her with jail.  From 
what we observed in our courtroom observations it was rare, if not never, 
that anyone spoke so frankly to judges.
While it is unclear how she came up with the $100, her motivation 
to do so was clear.  “It makes me want to go in a rush and pay my fines, so 
I won’t lose my kids,” she said later in the interview.  “[A]re you in dan-
ger of losing your kids?” the interviewer asked.  “No, not through DCFS 
[Department of Children and Family Services], no, but if I go to jail.”  Jail 
is punishment enough for any individual, but it is a special threat for a 
single mother with few social supports.  Partial payment of her monetary 
sanctions was the sole result of the threat of jail.  The “structural asym-
metries”73 in the courtroom, especially for poor defendants, directed the 
respondent’s attention to the outcome of paying or going to jail.  As Jen-
ness and Calavita74 show, people in institutional contexts characterized 
71. Monica Bell Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
Yale L.J. 2054 (2017).
72. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from 
Every day Life (1998).
73. Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated Justice: A Con-
textual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Liti-
gation, 46 L. & Soc’y Rev., 1, 1 (2012).
74. Valerie Jenness & Kitty Calavita “It Depends on the Outcome”: Prisoners, Griev-
ances, and Perceptions of Justice, 52 L. & Soc’y Rev. 41 (2018).
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by such large power imbalances can experience the process as unfair be-
cause the outcome is so unfavorable.  In this case, the threat of jail is 
real and legal, even if the route to imposing it (if it were to comply with 
constitutional justice) is more involved than the judge seemed to convey.
If extortion itself is illegal,75 then it is not surprising that it felt 
like an illegitimate procedure for extracting court fines and fees for in-
terviewees.  Scholars have characterized such practices as constituting 
“predation”,76 “mercenary criminal justice”,77 “stategraft”,78 and “seizure”79 
of the assets of poor people.  We conclude that extortion is much more 
precise because it relates to a particular courtroom moment, experienced 
as a breach of procedural justice, when people feel they must pay—or 
else.  It also speaks to constitutional justice since such immediate threats 
are outside of the bounds of legal authorization.80
We heard an abundance of stories that illustrate extortion.  A resi-
dent of a county in the middle of the state told us:
When they threaten my life with the county [jail], I pay them some 
money . . . .  They tell me all the time, they’ll petition to revoke my 
probation and then you go to court, and if they revoke you, they be 
like, “We going to offer you 180 days [in county jail] unless you pay 
this amount.”  I’m fixing to pay this amount because I don’t want to 
do 180 days.
A thirty-nine-year-old White man from Chicago was similarly fac-
ing a probation revocation for not paying his fines and fees.  “I think that 
they’re testing me to fail,” he said.  “It’s like they wanted me to go to jail 
and this is one of the reasons, one of the ways I can go to jail for it.”  And 
a fifty-six-year-old Black woman from Chicago’s suburbs was not certain 
what would happen if she did not pay her fines before her probation time 
was up.  “It might be possible they could say, ‘We can send you back to 
jail’ . . . .  I’ve heard of that.  That they have locked up [people] that can’t 
75. Federal law defines extortion as “an offense that has as its elements the ex-
traction of anything of value from another person by threatening or placing that 
person in fear of injury to any person or kidnapping of any person.”  10 U.S.C. 
§ 3359(c)(2)(C) (2019).  Illinois does not have a specific statute for extortion, 
but the notion of using threat to extract something of value is referenced in stat-
utes about “Intimidation and Theft.”  720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-6 (2017); 720 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 5/16-1 (2019).
76. Joshua Page & Joe Soss, Criminal Justice Predation and Neoliberal Governance, 
in Rethinking Neoliberalism: Resisting the Disciplinary Regime (Sanford F. 
Schram and Marianna Pavolvskaya, eds., 2018).
77. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 4 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1175 (2014).
78. Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263 (2018).
79. Katzenstein et al., supra note 34.
80. In a lawsuit regarding incarceration for nonpayment of probation fees in 
Harpersville, Alabama, the judge ruled against the municipality noting that 
“a more accurate description of the Harpersville Municipal Court practices 
might be that of a judicially sanctioned extortion racket.”  The New Debtors’ 
Prisons, The Economist (Nov. 16, 2013), https://www.economist.com/ united-
states/2013/11/16/the-new-debtors-prisons.
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pay they fines or whatever.  They’re still holding them.”  To comply with 
the state constitution and the Supreme Court ruling, Illinois law requires 
that courts hold a hearing to determine if nonpayment was due to the 
defendant’s “intentional refusal to pay.”  None of the people we inter-
viewed got constitutional justice by being allowed such a hearing.  And 
far from a just procedure, they felt threatened at every turn.  “All you’re 
doing is buying freedom,” one man from downstate told us about pay-
ing his monetary sanctions under the threat of incarceration.  “That’s all 
you’re doing.  It’s not right.”
E. The Opaque and Greedy State
The final empirical finding speaks to breaches of procedural and 
distributive justice occasioned by the revenue generation of LFOs.  Re-
spondents protested the lack of transparency about where the revenue 
from monetary sanctions went and the intensity of the collection process 
(procedural).  Additionally, they offered critiques of what monetary sanc-
tions paid for and the state’s desire—as perceived by respondents—to 
profit from such revenues (distributive).
Courtrooms are awash with paper.81  Prosecutors wheel in push-
carts full of manila accordion folders that contain the accumulating 
records of a person’s case—police reports, defense attorney motions, 
pretrial evaluations, driving records, evidence from discovery, etc.  If 
someone is ultimately found (or pleads) guilty, the judge signs a sentenc-
ing order.  This form is in quintuplicate, with one of the copies meant for 
the defendant.  On the sentencing order there are checkboxes indicating 
the specific court costs, fines, and fees, specifying the various amounts 
and the statute that authorizes them.  For example, “$50.00 DUI Road 
Side Memorial Fee (730 ILCS 5/5–9-1.17)” would be checked for any-
one convicted of driving under the influence, even if there was no victim. 
Despite this specificity, many people we interviewed had little knowl-
edge of where their dollars were going.  Many reported that they did not 
receive any tally of what they owed.  Others remembered seeing some 
paperwork, but said that their probation officer kept it in a file at the 
courthouse.  This opacity raised procedural justice concerns for them.
A thirty-six-year-old Black man from Chicago’s suburbs said: “I 
think they keep it and put it towards whatever they need.  Once it’s sent 
in or they take it from us, we have no idea where it goes.”
A forty-year-old Black man also from Chicago’s suburbs reported:
All the sudden I get a whole lot of fees to pay for.  I don’t think it’s 
fair.  They took my bond money, so I thought I was going to get some 
of that back, but that’s going towards the, I don’t know where the 
bond money went.
In downstate Illinois, a thirty-year-old Black man segued from proce-
dural justice to distributive justice.  He asked, only somewhat rhetorically:
81. Kasey Henricks, Power to the Paperwork?  Mandatory Financial Sanctions and 
the Bureaucratic Means to Racially Unequal Ends, 63 Am. Behav. Sci. 1 (2019).
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I mean, ‘cause why should I give you some money?  I mean, what 
you puttin’ it towards?  They can’t even tell you what they puttin’ it 
towards.  Come on.  I mean, they could be profiting from money for 
all we know.  We don’t know.
A twenty-nine-year-old White man from the suburbs of Chicago 
also suspected distributive foul play alongside the procedural infraction 
of no transparency:
I don’t know.  I’m not even sure where this court costs go to.  How 
come they keep going up?  Is it going towards the community?  I 
doubt it.  Where’s it going?  Judge’s pockets?  Somebody else’s pock-
ets?  I doubt it’s going somewhere helpful ‘cause I haven’t seen any 
improvements.  So what is it helping?
These sentiments first offer a critique of procedural justice.  Given 
that a form with detailed accounting exists, the breach here is the result 
of the fast-paced nature of the court, the overwhelming amount of paper, 
the limited time and attention of court personnel, and the procedural 
complexity of courtroom processes.82  In our courtroom observations, 
judges announced the amounts and breakdowns of fines and fees so fast 
that we often could not record them, and sometimes they simply said 
“plus court fines and costs,” with no amounts at all.  In our interviews 
with prosecutors, public defenders, and probation officers, they conveyed 
that the financial part of the sentence was secondary to prison or jail time, 
or court-mandated program participation, and so they did not routinely 
review these details on the sentencing order with their clients.  These data 
corroborate defendants’ perspective of a lack of information regarding 
what they were supposed to pay and where it was going.
Even when they read the paperwork, it was not illuminating or 
satisfying.  A twenty-seven-year-old White woman in the greater Chica-
go metropolitan area said: “Because when you look into certain things 
you owe fines for, like keeping documents at the courthouse costs me 
money . . . I guess I don’t really understand that.”  Or a fifty-four-year-old 
Black woman from an inner-ring Chicago suburb said, “The way they 
itemize was stuff that wasn’t even pertaining to me as far as I remember.” 
And a thirty-one-year-old White woman from midstate read aloud and 
annotated some of the things on her sentencing order:
So, why is it that I’m having to pay all these fees that are underneath 
here?  Like I said before, it’s the “statutory surcharge, $75 VCVA 
 [Violent Crime Victim Assistance] penalty, offense on or after 
7/16/12.”  Then it’s got “child advocacy center fee $15, state police 
operations assistance fee $12.50, medical costs fund $10.”  What does 
any of that have to do with me?  I had no medical costs, the state po-
lice are not the ones that pulled me over, and there was no children 
in the car when it happened, so it has nothing to do with children.  
Not to mention, it wasn’t a felony so statutory surcharge should not 
82. Rebecca L Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Rela-
tional and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 Am. Soc. Rev. 909 
(2015).
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even qualify.  And, VCVA penalty?  It doesn’t even explain what that 
abbreviation is.
As this evidencee shows, the existence of the sentencing order did not 
offer procedural justice because it was undecipherable.
Even if respondents did not know what they were paying for, there 
was no question that they had to pay.  Aside from the threats previously 
discussed, the intensity of collection also breached respondents’ sense of 
procedural justice.  In our courtroom observations, we could sit for hours 
and watch the exact same interaction over and over again.  The only thing 
that changed was the person standing in front of the judge.  “How much 
can you pay today on your fines and costs?” the judge would ask.  The 
answer might be $10, $25 or $100.  To that, the judge would send the 
defendant to the clerk’s window to pay and bring back their receipt as 
proof.  An interviewee in downstate Illinois experienced just what we 
saw: “Because they want their money, you see?  First thing they ask you. 
You pay today?  You pay today?  You pay today?  You pay today?”  The 
repetition of the question represented the steady stream of defendants to 
which it was asked.
The demands to pay were unrelenting.  A twenty-nine-year-old 
Black man in the Chicago suburbs said the judge admonished him, 
“You got to pay these court fees and fines.  I understand that it’s hard 
for you.  Just pay them when you can.”  While seemingly sympathetic, 
the recognition of hardship was no relief for the obligation to pay.  A 
nineteen-year-old Asian man in the Chicago suburbs described his inter-
action with his probation officer: “Last time, she asked me for money—if 
I could come give her money next time I see her on March 9th.  She was 
like, ‘Try and come up with something’.”  This exchange sounds more like 
one with a loan shark—one part solicitous, one part coercive—than a 
legal interaction.  And in a farther out suburb of Chicago, a thirty-year-
old Black man narrated his interaction with the judge:
I have some fines to pay and I pretty much told the judge that I didn’t 
have it  .  .  .  .    I was basically in a situation where I was living in a 
hotel.  All my money was being basically drained by this hotel I was 
living in.  I didn’t have the financial ability to pay the fines and fees 
at the time.  I was homeless. [Interviewer: What’d he say?]  He gave 
me some time.  I have some time to come up with some money.  He 
didn’t really be too hard on me, but they still want their money.
This respondent experienced the judge’s actions as lenient and kind be-
cause the reference point was the ever present threat of jail.  The deferred 
due date in the face of the extreme hardship of homelessness, however, 
conveyed the reality:  In the end, “they still want their money.”  He char-
acterized the collections process as an “imaginary leash.”83
The intensity of collections was not accompanied by inquiries about 
if people could pay.  The implementation of the 2018 law that offers 
waivers should attenuate some of these breaches of procedural justice. 
83.  Harris, supra note 32, at 72–73 (discussing the related concept of “tethering”).
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Instead of badgering people to pay, defendants should be informed of the 
waivers, and perhaps even assisted in applying for them.  Yet because the 
law allows waivers for fees but not fines and other costs, these kinds of 
exchanges will continue even with full implementation of the law.84  The 
relentless demands for money at the monthly (or more) payment-status 
hearings represent procedures that confuse and cloud the court’s formal 
purpose of protecting victims, adjudicating guilt, and meting out just pun-
ishment.85  Instead of those functions, the procedures made the criminal 
justice system and the state appear greedy to respondents.
Without full information and because the collection was so tireless, 
respondents reasoned that their monies were being used to enrich the 
courts and court actors, which they saw as punitive rather than produc-
tive entities.  This dispossession to pay for their own punishment violated 
their sense of distributive justice.  A forty-nine-year-old White woman 
in Chicago said that “they claim” that the court costs, fines, and fees are 
“for paperwork and administration fees and the time in the courtroom.” 
But she saw the state as double-dipping since those costs should be paid 
out of general tax revenue.  Instead, she saw monetary sanctions as going 
directly to the surveillance she experienced.  “It feels like a processing 
fee—shipping and handling, you know—that type of thing.”  A seemingly 
innocuous enough phrase, “shipping and handling” astutely captures the 
transportation of defendants to and from jail and prison and in and out of 
the court.  Handling is what probation officers do.  They monitor, advise, 
check, record, and report.  As metaphorical packages, defendants pay 
their own freight costs.  In an unjust distribution of costs, this woman saw 
defendants paying for a system for which they are not the beneficiaries, 
but rather the captive merchandise.
A thirty-eight-year-old White woman from midstate Illinois also 
spoke to the morose logic of the merchandise paying for its own shipping 
and handling:
I feel as a member in society that they’re double charging us [first 
in taxes, then in monetary sanctions].  I’ve more than paid for that 
jail.  Then they want to call it their jail and we, as the people, are like, 
“That’s my jail.  I sleep there.  You feed me.  It’s me that gets locked 
in.  You work for me, I don’t work for you.  You work for my crimes.  
That’s how you get paid.  You get paid because I caused trouble.”
This was a strident indictment of the distributive processes upon which 
this respondent felt the criminal justice system runs.  She did not deny 
her crimes—three felony assault convictions and several misdemeanor 
traffic violations.  She had spent time in jail and had been on probation 
for years.  At the time of the interview, she had joined a church and said, 
84. Colgan, supra note 5, at 9–10 (arguing that much advocacy and litigation has 
been directed at post-hoc protection, while what is needed is “protection at sen-
tencing,” which the Eighth Amendment provides).
85. Kohler-Hausmann refers to this as managerial justice.  Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Misdemeanorland: Criminal courts and social control in an age of broken 
windows policing (2018).
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“I have been improving myself, changing my people, places and things, 
and that’s where I really noticed the difference.”  Yet she still owed nearly 
$10,000 in court costs, fines, and fees.  In her mind, that money would pay 
for the system that offered her only punishment, never rehabilitation.  In 
effect, whatever fines and fees she paid would use monies from someone 
earning less than $500/month to fund the jail where she had spent six 
months, and to pay the salaries of the people who ordered her there.
The maintenance (or enrichment) of the state at poor people’s ex-
pense constituted an affront to distributive justice.  Respondents were 
quite creative in expressing this sentiment.  A thirty-one-year-old Black 
woman in downstate Illinois used the word “greed” explicitly.  “It’s like 
it don’t matter, I’m just taking your money.  They just want your money, 
they’re just greedy.”  Others used different terminology.  A twenty-nine-
year-old White man in Chicago’s suburbs said, “It’s pretty common 
nowadays to get hit with big court costs, just for being an idiot, I guess. 
Everyone’s money-hungry—corrupt.”  A forty-nine-year-old White 
woman from Chicago commented: “It just seems like a big old fat wallet.” 
A sixty-year-old Black man in a distant Chicago suburb had this to say: 
“In these driving cases out here, I just look at it as like a cash cow.  That 
they just raking in all this money . . . .  I don’t know, it’s just like a money 
machine, and they’re just eating you alive financially.”  A twenty-three-
year-old White man from downstate explained: “I’m charged nearly $500 
for something that costs about $0–$100.  Now you’re robbing me.  If I rob 
you it’s a crime.  Now you’re robbing me.  That’s not cool.”  And a twenty-
year-old Black man from an inner-ring suburb of Chicago relayed:
They don’t give a shit.  They want their money ‘cause I fucked up in 
their system.  All I am to them is a paycheck, and if I don’t pay, I go 
back to jail.  And if I want to get out of jail, I gotta get some more 
money.  And not me, whoever I’m calling on the outside to go get it 
for me on the inside.
Greedy, money hungry, a wallet, a cash cow, a money machine, a robber, 
a paycheck.  In the Timbs decision, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the con-
cern that monetary sanctions would be used as a revenue source was 
“scarcely hypothetical.”86  Revenue generation seemed readily apparent 
to the people we talked to.  If Ginsburg meant this to be another grounds 
upon which to evaluate constitutional justice, most monetary sanctions 
would fail the test.
The affront to distributive justice, however, is not due to the col-
lection of revenue per se, but rather because the specific source of that 
revenue is so relatively poor.  “Why don’t you take it from the people 
who actually do have money?” asked one interviewee.  Of course states 
do bring in millions of dollars in revenue from nonpoor people, espe-
cially in traffic violations.  But the respondents we interviewed don’t see 
those people.  We rarely saw them in our hours of courtroom observa-
tions.  Anyone with the means to do so could pay the fines and costs 
86. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
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at the police station, with credit cards, or online.  The courtroom is the 
domain of those who cannot make bail, cannot afford a lawyer to get 
charges dismissed or reduced, or cannot get off probation because of an 
outstanding financial balance.  Their worldview is developed as they sit 
and wait for their cases to be called and as they interact with the lawyers, 
judges, clerks, and probation department.  What they see is a ravenous 
machine taking from the poor and giving to a system that does not return 
any benefit to them, but rather perpetuates their custody.
Conclusion
In this Article we asked the question: do monetary sanctions align 
with important forms of justice?  Taking the perspective of the people in-
volved in the criminal justice system who we interviewed, we find that the 
majority of monetary sanctions imposed on this population are excessive 
(disproportionate and beyond their ability to pay) and thus do not pro-
vide constitutional justice.  Many of the people we interviewed owed in 
excess of their monthly income, mostly for nonviolent offenses.  When 
they did pay, they did so by not paying other essential bills and costs. 
Their inability to pay made the punishment disproportionate to their 
crime and redistributed monies in a regressive fashion.  In drawing this 
conclusion, we add empirical support to Colgan’s doctrinal argument that 
an examination of the “five key principles [that] emerge from the pro-
portionality cases of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause from 
which the excessiveness test is borrowed  .  .  .  [supports] the conclusion 
that a defendant’s financial condition is relevant to assessing the severity 
of punishment for use in weighing its proportionality.”87
To conclude, we turn to the question: What is the purpose of this 
excess?  Garland88 offers a sophisticated analysis of southern lynchings of 
African Americans as penal excess.  Why did southern lynch mobs engage 
in collective and public violence despite the fact that U.S. criminal law 
had dismissed such penalties centuries prior?  The answer:
They did so to invoke a set of meanings and distinctions that Ameri-
ca’s increasingly egalitarian legal system had sought to leave behind.  
The lynchers’ use of ‘‘cruel and unusual’’ punishments was a delib-
erate flouting of the norms of modern law and civilized penology, a 
self-conscious choice, intended to degrade and defile black offenders 
and to refuse them the treatment afforded to convicted criminals by 
the criminal justice institutions of the time.89
Of course the practice of monetary sanctions does not compare to 
the brutal and homicidal violence of lynchings.  The important insight, 
however, is the role of penal excess in damaging and humiliating a mar-
ginalized population and doing so under the cover of law.  Just as Garland 
87. Colgan, supra note 5, at 47; see also McLean, supra note 11.
88. David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in 
Twentieth‐Century America, 39 L. & Soc. Rev. 793 (2005).
89. Id. at 814–15.
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shows that lynchings were not extralegal in the way often assumed, the 
extraction of monetary sanctions happens in plain sight and with the full 
participation of officers of the court.  The threat (without a hearing) of 
jail for nonpayment is regularly used to extort payment (or to actually 
put people in jail).  The ultimate purpose of the excess is social control, 
the social control of Black people in the case of lynchings, and the con-
trol of poor people—or, in seventeenth-century England, “his Majesty’s 
Protestant Subjects”90—in the case of monetary sanctions.  The Eighth 
Amendment is about curtailing the excesses to which penal power can 
be used against disfavored groups.  A forty-nine-year-old Black man in 
Chicago expressed this clearly: “You know, sometimes laws are to protect 
people, but other times laws can be construed to keep people in line.”91
Beyond constitutional justice, we also ask about how monetary 
sanctions accord with retributive, procedural, and distributive justice. 
Our data reveal serious breaches of each.  While several respondents ac-
knowledged guilt and accepted the idea of a monetary punishment, most 
did so with a caveat about it being “high and outrageous,” as one woman 
said.  This disproportionate punishment violates retributive justice.  The 
fact that many respondents had done jail and/or prison time, and were 
serving probation with requirements for community service, classes, or 
other court-mandated programs, made the financial punishment appear 
even more disproportionate to their offense, further violating retributive 
justice and perhaps also the constitutional consideration of excessiveness. 
Procedural justice was undermined because payments were extracted 
under the threat of force.  They paid to avoid jail.  They were “buying 
their freedom.”  This extortionist regime not only felt procedurally wrong 
to respondents, it also flouted the law—another sphere of constitutional 
injustice.  Finally, bewilderment about where the money went and im-
pressions of the greedy state violated both procedural and distributive 
justice.  Procedurally, respondents were not thoroughly informed about 
the destination or purpose of the fines, fees, and costs they paid, yet they 
were hounded for them in frequent court appearances.  Regarding reve-
nue and distributive justice, monetary sanctions are regressive.  They are 
90. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 694.
91. The disproportionate poverty of African Americans and their disproportionate 
entanglements in the criminal justice system make this also a race story.  See 
Harris et al., supra note 32; Kasey Henricks & Daina Cheyenne Harvey, Not 
One but Many: Monetary Punishment and the Fergusons of America, 32 Soc. 
F. 930 (2017); Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial 
Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 
L. & Soc’y Rev. 695 (2010); Melissa Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How 
Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bankruptcy, ProPublica Il-
linois, Feb. 27, 2018, https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chica-
go-ticket-debt-bankruptcy; U.S. Comm’n. on Civ. Rts., Targeted Fines and Fees 
against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications 
(2017) www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf; see Gar-
land, supra note 88, at 798 (explaining lynching as simultaneously racist and a 
mode “of class and gender control”).
77Breaches of Justice in the Monetary sanctions regiMe
disproportionately exacted upon those least able to pay, and redirected 
to the state, which uses them on criminal justice systems that further de-
fendants’ impoverishment.
These findings argue for the elimination of monetary sanctions as a 
sentencing practice for poor and near poor defendants.  Several scholars, 
organizations and institutions have put forward such proposals.  Har-
vard’s Criminal Justice Policy Program recommends eliminating all fees 
and surcharges.92  Colgan93 argues for “graduated” economic sanctions 
along the lines of “day fines” in Europe, and McLean similarly argues 
for setting a penalty such “that it could reasonably be expected to be 
paid . . . while permitting an individual to maintain some minimal level of 
economic subsistence.” 94  For many people we interviewed, that amount 
is likely be $0.  The National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Prac-
tices—an entity created by the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators—offers several principles, 
including: funding courts wholly from general revenue sources rather 
than from fees and costs, and admonishing states not to adopt mandato-
ry fines, fees, and surcharges for “misdemeanors and traffic-related and 
other low-level offenses and infractions.”95  The American Law Institute’s 
Model Penal Code recommends similar reforms on the legislative side.96 
These would all be welcome efforts to the respondents we interviewed 
who experienced monetary sanctions as violations of multiple forms of 
justice.  A thirty-six-year-old Black man in downstate Illinois summarized 
the damage done as a result of such penal excesses “I don’t get this place 
down here as far as their judicial system.  They wicked.”  Kings, emperors, 
and wickedness—these symbols do not convey justice in a modern crim-
inal justice system.
92. Sharon Brett & Mitali Nagrecha, Proportionate Financial Sanctions: Policy Pre-
scriptions for Judicial Reform, Harv. L. Sch. Crim. Just. Pol’y Program, Sept. 
2019.
93. Colgan, supra note 61.
94. McLean, supra note 11, at 896.
95. Nat’l Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Prac. (2017) Principles on Fines, 
Fees, and Bail Practices, 7 (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/ 
Topics/Fines%20and%20Fees/Principles-Fines-Fees.ashx.
96. American Law Institute, Univ. of Minn., Model Penal Code: Sentencing. 
Minneapolis 634 (2017).

